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ABSTRACT. How do people arrive at assessments of their own life quality? A series of 
models was developed to provide an interpretation of the way the factors of cognition 
and affect operate along with evaluations of specific life concerns (domains) in the 
perception of well-being. Following previous research, cognition was defined operationally 
as a factor which accounts for the covariance among a set of assessments of life-as-a- 
whole after affect, as measured by Bradburn's scales, is partialled out and after allowance 
is made for the presence of correlated measurement errors. It was found that loadings on 
the cognitive factor, and hence the interpretation of this factor, changed little despite 
quite large changes in the models. Moreover, in all major comparisons, models that 
contained the cognitive factor fitted the data better than models that did not. Models 
that included affect as the only variable intervening between the domains and the life-as- 
a-whole factor led to results that were intuitively difficult to accept. In the preferred 
model both affect and cognition were positioned as intervening variables. In this model it 
was found that the domain evaluations had no direct impact on life-as-a-whole assess- 
ments - the contribution of the domains was indirect by way of their association with 
cognition and affect. It was hypothesised that associated with each domain was a domain- 
specific element of affect and a domain-specific element of cognition. The linear additive 
relation found by previous researchers between domain evaluations and life-as-a-whole 
assessments would then be explainable as a statistical result arising from the summing of 
the domain-specific elements of affect and cognition. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper follows an earlier one (McKennell, 1978) which reviewed the 
general characteristics and implications of the distinction between cognition 
and affect in perceptions of well-being. 
Cognition refers here to the process whereby relativism enters into satis- 
faction judgements. Satisfactions, it is commonly held, are tied to the expec- 
tations and standards of comparison in terms of which current circumstances 
are being evaluated. It is possible, for example, for people in relatively disad- 
vantaged circumstances, because of their lower expectations, to report higher 
than average levels of satisfaction, and for the more privileged, because of 
their higher expectations, to be dissatisfied. Affect, on the other hand, refers 
to the individual's immediate feeling state which is not anchored, or not tied 
to the same extent, to cognitive frames of reference. 
This kind of distinction is sometimes made, at a semantic level, between 
'happiness' and 'satisfaction'. The scales developed by Bradbum (1969) to 
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measure affect do correlate more highly with happiness than with life-satisfac- 
tion ratings, but only marginally. 
The earlier paper (McKennell, 1978) posited and provided some evidence 
to show that currently used rating-scale indicators of perceived well-being are 
compounds of both affect and cognition, differing only marginally in the 
extent to which they depend on one or the other factor. One analysis was 
reported, for example, which focussed on the area of non-overlap between 
happiness and life-satisfaction ratings by dichotomising and cross-tabulating 
the two indicators and then observing what further variables changed diagnos- 
tically between appropriate cells of the 2 x 2 table. Differential trends with 
age and education, barely discernible in straightforward correlations against 
the indicators, then emerged strongly along with further interesting differ- 
ences for other outside variables. 
In addition, a second kind of analysis was reported which forms the basis 
of the present paper. These analyses drew on data sets, regrettably few, which 
included Bradburn's affect scales and also a range of global ratings of sub- 
jective well-being. Bradburn's (1969) affect scales were taken as the best 
available measures of affect. Although no direct or even proxy indicators of 
cognition were available, the considerable variance in the global ratings which 
remained after the affect scales were partialled out and allowance was made 
for correlated method effects was attributed to cognition. Starting points 
were then explored for analysing the role of cognition and affect more exactly 
by means of path models which included the cognitive factor as an unob- 
served variable. 
The present paper continues this line of investigation. A related paper 
(Andrews and McKennell, 1978) uses a similar approach to develop empirical 
estimates of the percentage of variance in certain measures of perceived well- 
being that reflect cognitive, affective, or other (mainly random or correlated 
error) factors. 
2. P R O C E D U R E  
2.1 Analytical Strategy and Scheme of  the Present Paper 
Our research objective is to construct a model which will not only include a 
cognitive factor but will provide an interpretation of the way this factor 
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operates along with affect and evaluations of specific concerns in the percep- 
tion of global well-being or life-as-a-whole (LAW). In such a model the LAW 
factor will be positioned as an endogenous variable and the flow of  deter- 
mining influences from other factors will be portrayed as cause-effect relation- 
ships. Because it seeks to specify causal paths between factors, this kind of  
model may be referred to, briefly, as a 'factor-path' model. 
Such a model can be constructed in two stages. In the first stage we can 
develop a path model which contains factors as unobserved or unmeasured 
variables but does not interpret the relationships between them. The factors 
in this first stage are left as exogenous unobserved variables which occur only 
as the unanalysed causes of the observed variables. The factors may or may 
not be correlated. At the second stage an interpretation of the association 
between the factors in terms of causal influences is attempted. 
It makes good sense to proceed in the two-stage fashion in dealing with 
the factor of cognition. Cognition is an unmeasured, i.e., unobserved, variable 
in the sense that we do not have even indirect or proxy measures available. 
It is theory together with the observed pattern of  relationships among the 
other variables in the system which give the cognitive factor its meaning. 
There would be no point in attempting to construct factor-path models that 
include cognition unless it could be demonstrated that (1) a factor of  cognition 
can be given consistent meaning and (2) is necessary to explain the covariation 
among the set of  observed variables. This demonstration is made in Section 3 
of  the present paper. 
Section 4.2 examines factor-path models that do not include cognition, 
and attempts to develop them as far as they will go. The consequences of  
adding in the cognitive factor are then examined in Section 4.3. An evalu- 
ation of factor-path models with and without a cognitive factor is then made 
in Section 4.4. Section 5 considers some parallel analyses on other data sets. 
Section 6 summarises and discusses the results. 
2.2 Statistical Techniques 
Since cognition is available to us only as a residualised factor and we wish to 
study its role in the flow of influences leading to life quality assessments, we 
were led naturally to methods involving path models and factor analytic 
techniques. It has been shown that such methods are special cases of  struc- 
tural equation models (Goldberger, 1972; Goldberger and Duncan, 1973). 
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Joreskog (1969, 1970, 1973) has developed a powerful maximum-likelihood 
technique for simultaneously estimating parameters for observed and unob- 
served variables in a structural model that allows error components to be 
correlated. 
Model estimation. This method, as embodied in the LISREL computer 
program (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1976), provided the principal tool for the 
analyses reported throughout this paper. In their description of the LISREL 
model, Joreskog and Sorbom note that it 
consists of two parts: the measurement model and the structural equation model. The 
measurement model specifies how the latent variables or hypothetical constructs are 
measured in terms of the observed variables and is used to describe the measurement 
properties (validities and reliabilities) of the observed variables. The structural equation 
model specifies the causal relationships among the latent variables and is used to describe 
the causal effects and the amount of unexplained variance. 
By imposing various restrictions on the more general model, the LISREL 
program can easily be made to estimate the measurement model on its own. 2 
LISREL therefore provided us with a ready means for carrying through the 
two-stage strategy outlined above. The results in Section 3 were obtained using 
the measurement model. What we have termed factor-path models were 
obtained in Section 4 utilising the more general features of the program. 
As noted above it was essential for our operational definition of cognition 
that the covariance remaining among global indicators after affect was removed 
should also be shorn of correlated errors due to method effects. The capacity 
of the LISREL program to handle correlated errors was therefore of  prime 
importance for the analytical work. Considerable effort was expended in 
obtaining the best possible estimates for the method effects. This part of  the 
development work is reported in a separate paper (Andrews and McKennell, 
1978). For most of the analyses reported in this paper method-effect para- 
meters were constrained to equal the previously estimated values while we 
concentrated on other features of the model. 
Specification of the program input for LISREL is considerably facilitated 
if the model under examination is first drawn out in full detail as a path 
diagram. A few key models out of the many examined are shown as diagrams 
below. The diagrams are much more than computing aids. They share the 
property of all properly constituted path diagrams of "being isomorphic with 
the algebraic and statistical properties of the postulated system of variables" 
(Duncan, 1966). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the postulated 
causal and noncausal relationships of the model under investigation and its 
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path diagram. In the process of  specifying the diagrams, one is forced to be 
explicit about the properties being assumed for the model. This makes it 
easier to spot from the program output the reasons why a particular model is 
producing a relatively poor fit to the data and to think of improvements. 
Path analysis itself assumes that certain basic properties hold for the data, 
namely that the measures approximate interval scales and the relationships 
are tolerably free from curvilinearities and interactions. Previous work has 
shown that data from perceived quality of  life surveys conform reasonably 
well to these assumptions (see Andrews and Withey, 1976, pp. 116-117; 
Campbell et al., 1976, pp. 77-80).  
Choosing among models. The computer program used to estimate the 
models includes a routine for calculating the fit of a model to the data. 
Unfortunately, for the relatively large sample sizes involved in our research, 
chi-square is not useful as a precise 'test' statistic for differentiating between 
theoretical structures. Save in limited circumstances, 3 accept-reject decisions 
associated with a statistical probability level of chi-square are not feasible. 
But chi-square can be used as a qualitative or descriptive statistic for explora- 
tory purposes. Incomp~/ring twomodels, the one with more fitted parameters, 
and therefore fewer degrees of freedom, usually yields a smaller chi.square. 
A large drop in chi-square, compared to the difference in degrees of freedom, indicates 
that the changes made in the model represent a real improvement. On the other hand, a 
drop in chi-square close to the difference in number of degrees of freedom indicates that 
the improvement in fit is obtained by 'capitalizing on chance,' and the added parameters 
may not have real significance and meaning (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1976, p. 12). 
This qualitative or descriptive use ofchi-square can therefore serve as an aid 
in assessing the fit of a particular model in relation to alternatives. Occasionally 
in moving from a more complex to a simpler model with fewer estimated 
parameters we found that chi-square actually decreased even though the 
degrees of freedom had increased (see for example Exhibit 7), and in these 
instances the chi-square comparison did seem to provide firm evidence for the 
improved fit of the simpler model. But in general we have not relied exclu- 
sively on statistical criteria of  goodness-of-fit but have weighed these against 
the substantive implications of alternative models. As Joreskog (1969, p. 201) 
has written, 
When to stop fitting additional parameters cannot be decided on a purely statistical basis. 
This is largely a matter of the experimenter's interpretations of the data based on sub- 
stantive theoretical and conceptual considerations. Ultimately the criteria for goodness 
of the model depends on the usefulness of it and the results it produces. 
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For comparisons among what we have termed factor-path models a second 
statistical dimension of adequacy becomes available. In these models one or 
more factors are serving as theoretically endogenous variables. The life-as-a- 
whole factor (LAW), for example, always occupies this position in our factor- 
path models. Such models can be compared with respect to the extent to 
which the variance in the theoretically endogenous variable is being predicted 
by the other variables in the proposed structure. The LISREL program com- 
putes an estimate of  the residual or unexplained variance for each endogenous 
variable in a structural equation model. This parameter is entirely analogous 
to the squared residual path coefficient in path analysis with observed varia- 
bles. It is equal to 1 - R  2 , where 'R'  here refers to the multiple correlation 
of a particular endogenous unobserved variable with the causal antecedent 
unobserved variables. Models can therefore be compared with respect to the 
size of residual coefficients. Burt (1973, p. 145) has referred to this second 
dimension of adequacy as the 'external validity' of a model "since it is solely 
concerned with the ability of the structure as a source of prediction". 
2.3 The data analysed 
The analyses require data which include measures o f  global well-being - e.g., 
evaluations of  life-as-a.whole; a set of  evaluations of  specific l i fe concerns - 
e.g., ratings of  family life, community, income, privacy, the national govern- 
ment, etc.; plus Bradburn's (1969) affect scales. Three different data sets have 
been examined. 
The bulk of the statistical work was carried out on one of the data sets in 
the Andrews-Withey series, namely their November 1972, Form 2 national 
survey. This was based on a representative sample of  American adults and 
included 1072 respondents. Full details about the measures are given in 
Andrews and Withey (1976). Results from the analysis of these data appear in 
Section 3 and 4 of the present paper, with brief mention also being made in 
Section 5. 
Data from a British survey were also analysed. This survey is described by 
Abrams (1976) and Hall (1976) and involved interviews in March 1975 with 
932 respondents drawn from a representative sample of  people aged 16 and 
over living in British metropolitan areas. These results are reported in Section 5. 
The third data set was assembled from a series of  American national surveys 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and is described in a 
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paper by Burr, Wiley, Minor, and Murray (1978). Section 5 also includes a 
brief discussion of these results. 
3. F A C T O R  M O D E L S :  A F F E C T - C O G N I T I O N  V E R S U S  A F F E C T - L A W  
3.1 Concepts and Procedures 
The essence of the comparison to be made in this section is conveyed in 
simplified geometric form in Exhibit 1. 
Cognition factor 
LAW 





Exhibit 1. Positions of global indicators of life-as-a-whole (LAW) in the two dimensio- 
nal space defined by cognition and affect (simplified results). 
Although Exhibit 1 is not a plot of  actual data it has been drawn to reflect 
the main findings. A handful of  indicators of global well-being are shown as 
points plotted with respect to two orthogonal axes representing the affect and 
cognition factors. Following the usual conventions for the geometric repre. 
sentation of factors (Harman, 1976), a factor loading for an indicator is repre- 
sented by its projection on one of the axes. Thus all indicators load on both 
affect and cognition to varying degrees and they duster together in the factor 
space because they are fairly highly intercorrelated. Only one affect factor is 
shown for simplicity, its positon being f'txed by an affect scale. There are no 
measured variables to define the cognitive factor directly, but its position has 
been fixed by making it orthogonal to the affect factor. Cognition is thereby 
defined as a factor which accounts for the covariance in the observed measures 
which remains after that due to affect is partialled out. 
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The life-as-a-whole factor, LAW, is defined by the factor axis which passes 
through the centroid of the cluster of indicators. If  all points fell on this axis, 
then only one factor would be needed to reproduce the observed correlations. 
To the extent that the points spread away from the LAW axis, two factors 
will fit the data better. The points are shown clustered fairly close to the 
LAW axis, and this suggests that this one factor will do a reasonable job of 
accounting for the observed correlations. But there is some scatter around the 
line, and hence the fit to the observed data will be somewhat better with a 
two factor solution. This is the essence of what was found in the analyses to 
be described below. 
Before these analyses are introduced, two further observations are neces- 
sary. If the same measurement method is employed for the global indicators, 
then some part of their covariation will arise from that fact alone. The cova- 
riance that remains after affect is partialled out would thus be due to both a 
method factor and to cognition. It follows that a method factor must be 
introduced into the analysis. Cognition will then be defined as the factor 
which accounts for the covariance among a set of global indicators after affect 
is partialled out and after allowance has been made for the presence of 
correlated error. For the sake of simplicity, the figure in Exhibit 1 omits this 
method factor. 
Exhibit 1 simplifies the actual analysis in another way. The figure shows 
just a single affect factor whereas Bradburn's (1969) work suggests the neces- 
sity of considering two distinct types of affect: Positive affect and Negative 
affect. A separate scale for each type of affect is included in our analysis, and 
these two types of  affect have been included in our models as two distinct 
factors. 
A comparison of the goodness-of-fit of  factor models can be made by 
means of confirmatory factor analysis using the LISREL program. Exhibits 
2a and 2b show the details of the factor models being compared. 
While the geometric representation in Exhibit 1 above was helpful in con- 
veying the basic notions, it is not adequate for describing the details of  the 
analytic work. The representation in Exhibit 2 and throughout the remainder 
of this paper will be in terms of causal path diagrams. The assumptions of  the 
model are mapped precisely in the diagrams. The relationship between a 
factor (shown as an oval) and an observed variable (shown as a rectangle) is 
represented as a causal path, the path coefficient being equal to the size of  
the factor loading. (All coefficients are reported in standardized form - i.e., 
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Exhibit 2a. 
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LISREL fit statistics: Chi 2 = 23, df = 12, N = 1072: 
All exogenous factors statistical fy independ=mt, 
Factor model explaining global indicators by affect and cognition while 
allowing for random and correlated measurement errors. 
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/ 
/ , f e  
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LISREL fit statistics: Chi 2 = 62, df = 22, N=1072. 
Exhibit 2b. Factor model explaining global indicators by affect and life-as-a-whole 
(LAW) while allowing for random and correlated measurement errors. 
after transforming all variables and factors to have variances of  1.0.) The 
absence of a path implies a restriction built into the model: that the linkage 
has been fixed at zero. Unanalysed correlational associations are shown by 
double-headed arrows. 
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The model assumes that the variance in the global indicators derives from 
three sources: the true effect of  the underlying factor, a method effect 
giving rise to correlated errors, and a residual or random error component. 
Accordingly the parameter estimates associated with the linkages between 
a measured variable and either a wellbeing or a method factor are interpreted 
as validity or method effect coefficients, respectively. The parameter values 
shown in Exhibit 2a and 2b are the estimates computed by the LISREL 
program. Also shown are the computed chi-square values which are based on 
how well the constrained and free parameters that comprise the model repro- 
duce the observed correlations. As discussed earlier, the change in chi-square 
in relation to the change in degrees of freedom provides a means of comparing 
two models in terms of their fit to the observed data. 
A model that includes global indicators and cognitive as well as affect fac- 
tors, as in Exhibit 2a, can be regarded in two ways. In the first place, it can be 
seen as a way of partitioning the variance of each global indicator into a part 
due to cognition and parts due to positive and negative affect. This topic has 
been addressed in a separate paper (Andrews and McKennell, 1978). The 
present paper focusses on the second way in which the model in Exhibit 2a 
can be regarded, namely as a representation of  the structure underlying per- 
ceptions of well-being. From this perspective Exhibit 2a can be regarded as 
one hypothesis to be compared with an alternative hypothesis embodied in 
Exhibit 2b. The latter model covers the same set of  observed variables but 
dispenses with the cognitive factor and substitutes a life-as-a-whole factor. 
Exhibit 2b thus attempts to account for the covarianee among the global 
indicators, other than Bradburn's affect scales, by only o n e  substantive factor. 
Apart from method effects, the global indicators are represented as tapping 
only this one underlying factor, life-as-a-whole (LAW), and any correlation 
they have with the affect measure is held to come about indirectly through 
the correlation between the LAW factor and the affect factor. In what 
follows, models of the former type (Exhibit 2a) will be referred to as 'affect- 
cognition' models, while those like that in Exhibit 2b will be referred to as 
'affect-LAW' models. The affect-LAW models leave unanalysed the possibility 
that the original evaluations may be compounded of separate cognitive and 
affective factors. The hypothesis that a cognitive factor plays a role in the 
perception of well-being can therefore be tested by seeing which type of 
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Exhibit 3a. Factor model explaining global indicators by affect and cognition in the 
presence of domains, while allowing for random and correlated measure- 







Exhibit  3b. 
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Fixqr 87 
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LISREL fi t  statistics: Chi 2 : 603, df = 207, N = 1072. 
Estimoted relationships [r's) among exogenousfoctocs If= fixed] 
§ -A LAW D] DE D3 D4 D5 
Af feat neg. f.OO 
LAW .52 -.45 
Oomoin 1 .48 ".37 .80 
Domoin 2 .40 -.37 .70 .57 
Domoin 3 .20 - .2t  ,24 .12 .30 
0omoin 4 .22 -.29 .4t .30 .57 .39 
Domoin. 5 .19 ".36 .51 .49 .St .23 .50 
7'-pt, retd. f.O0 f,O0 f,O0 f.O0 fO0 f~O fDO f,O0 
Factor model explaining globaJ indicators by affect and llfe-as-a-whole 
(LAW) in the presence of  domains, while allowing for random and corre- 
lated measurement error. 
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3.2 Statistical Results: Affect-Cognition Compared with Affect-LA W 
The models in Exhibits 2a and 2b afford one contrast, the simplest we will be 
examining, between affect-cognition and affect-LAW models. An important 
finding is that the affect-cognition model has a smaller chi-square value in 
relation to its degrees of freedom than does the affect-LAW model. The 
difference in chi-squares (39.4) is substantially greater than the loss in degrees 
of freedom (10). The results indicate therefore that the affect-cognition model, 
Exhibit 2a, is here providing the better fit to the observed data. s 
The structures for the perception of well-being that we consider below will 
include evaluations of specific "life concerns as well as of global well-being. 
The contrast between the affect-cognition and affect-LAW models needs 
therefore to be extended to more complete models that include factors at the 
domain as well as the global level. ~ This is done in the models in Exhibits 3a 
and 3b. 
The 15 domain items used here were selected on the basis of  earlier work 
on the factor analysis and perceptual mapping of  much larger sets of domain 
evaluations (60-100)  (see Chapter 2 and Appendix E, Andrews and Withey, 
1976). The five factors used in Exhibit 3 were chosen, first, so that their con- 
stituent items would be well spread out in the perceptual space established 
by the perceptual mapping and, second, so that there would be a range in the 
strength of  the correlations between the domain evaluations and the affect 
measures. 7 
The model in Exhibit 3a, which is an affect-cognition model, fits more 
parameters than that in Exhibit 3b, a LAW model, but the loss of I0 degrees 
of  freedom is again small compared to the much larger reduction in chi-square 
(41). For these more complete structures, then, it can also be inferred that 
the affect-cognition model fits the data better than the affect-LAW model. 
3.3 Statistical Results: Affect-Cognition Combined with LAW 
Eventually, in Section 4, we will want to consider path models that make the 
LAW factor an endogenous variable dependent on both cognition and affect 
as well as domain evaluations. Therefore, the work in the present section 
needs to be still further extended to cover factor models that include all 
three global factors in addition to domain evaluations. This is done in the 
model in Exhibit 4. This model combines the features of the models in both 
Exhibits 3a and 3b. Three of the global indicators have been used to define 
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Exhibit 4. A model containing factors for both cognition and life-as-a-whole (LAW), 
as well as affect, domain,  and method factors. 
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the LAW factor and the remaining three to define a global cognition factor. 
The result can be considered either as a variant of the model of Exhibit 3b 
into which a cognitive factor has been introduced, or of the model of Exhibit 
3a into which a LAW factor has been included. 
It is important to note that despite the added complexity, the parameter 
values in Exhibit 4 are consistent with those derived in the simpler models. 
The loadings of the three indicators defining global cognition are virtually 
identical with those in Exhibit 3a, and, except for the additional new correla- 
tions among the now expanded set of factors, all parameters in Exhibit 4 are 
also consistent with those in Exhibit 3b. 
As is the case for all the models considered in this section, there is no im- 
plication about the dynamics underlying the relationships between the factors. 
The elaboration of the model in Exhibit 4 into a factor-path model will be 
the concern of Section 4. 
A comparison of the reduction in chi-square relative to the drop in degrees 
of freedom suggests that, despite its added complexity, the model in Exhibit 
4 still fits the data better than the affect-LAW model in Exhibit 3b, though 
not better than the affect-cognition model in Exhibit 3a. The main point 
about the Exhibit 4 model, though, is that it contains all the factors necessary 
for considering the role played by cognition and affect together with domain 
evaluations in the perception of well-being we needed to be satisfied with the 
properties of this structure before proceeding further. 
3.4 Comments 
An outstanding feature of the overall results in this section is that the move- 
ment from the simpler models, in Exhibit 2a and 2b, to those in Exhibits 3a 
and 3b, and then to the still more complex model in Exhibit 4 produced very 
little change in the loadings of  the global indicators on either the LAW factor 
or the affect and cognition factors. The empirical meaning that can be assigned 
to these factors has thus remained constant even as models were expanded 
to encompass a wider range of observed variables, and as simpler models were 
integrated into more comprehensive structures. The constant meaning for the 
global factors of cognition, affects, and Life-as-a-whole in Exhibit 4 is partic- 
ularly impressive. 
At one point in the analytical work we wondered whether the results 
shown in Exhibit 4 were unduly influenced by the fact that the affect factors 
used to residualize global measures to produce cognition were in the direct 
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circuit involving the LAW factor. We therefore ran a still more complex 
model (not shown) in which the affect measures were introduced twice, once 
to residualise cognition and quite separately to relate to LAW. All the para- 
meter values turned out to be the same as in Exhibit 4. We find, therefore, 
that the separate parts of the more complex models are robust when taken on 
their own. The unobserved variables, the core concepts of the study, retain a 
consistent interpretation despite quite large changes in the models. This is an 
important consideration in the present study where one of these concepts, 
the cognitive factor, has no direct indicators but takes ist meaning from the 
structural relationship with other substantively different unobserved variables. 
4. F A C T O R - P A T H  M O D E L S  
4.1 ~ u c ~ n  
In the foregoing section factors were discussed only as causes of the observed 
variables. Models that contained a cognitive factor were contrasted with 
models that did not. It was concluded that the cognitive models yielded a 
somewhat better fit to the observed data. We now consider models that 
embody hypotheses about the causal relations among the factors themselves. 
These models go beyond a purely statistical accounting for the variances in 
the observed measures. They are psychological as well as statistical models in 
that they suggest the underlying processes by which respondents may arrive 
at their evaluations of their own well-being. Once again models that contain a 
cognitive factor are to be contrasted with models that do not, but the objec- 
tive now is to interpret the dynamics of the judgement process. As will be 
seen, we arrive at quite different interpretations according to which type of  
model we accept. 
Section 4.2 describes the development of models that do not contain the 
cognition factor, and the following section 4.3, considers models that do. The 
results are different and the contrasting implications for the judgement 
process are then discussed and evaluated in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Models Without a Cognitive Factor 
Exhibit 5 provides a convenient notation for the main features of the models 
to be discussed in this section. 
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Exhibit 5. Basic form for path model with affect intervening between domains and 
life-as-a-whole (LAW). 
Domain measures, D i and D], are shown linked by paths ci and c~ to affect 
(represented as a single variable for simplicity) and by paths fz" and j~ to a 
global measure, LAW (life-as-a-whole). The path from affect to the global 
measure is denoted by g. 
Models of increasing complexity, but of this same general form, were 
examined, and the same two main outcomes always emerged. First, the path g 
was always very small and could be eliminated without loss of explanatory 
power. Second, the c paths need to be replaced by correlational links: that is, 
affect needs to be moved from its position as an endogenous variable inter- 
vening between the domains and LAW, and made exogenous on a par with 
the domains. 
We will briefly describe the simpler analyses that gave these results before 
presenting in detail more developed models of this general type. Because a 
cognitive factor is not involved, models of the general type in Figure 5 can be 
constructed directly in terms of the observed variables. This type of model 
was constructed originally for the British data by Hall (1976). A replication 
on American data, and the implications for the c and g path was discussed 
briefly by McKennell (1978) and will be referred to again in Section 5 of  the 
present paper, a 
Affect: Exogenous or endogenous? Exhibit 6 shows one version (we shall 
call it 6A) of  the more elaborated model on which the basic theory was 
finally tested. It includes separate domain factors and a method factor, along 
with factors for affect and life-as-a-whole. 
Four variants of this model - all of  which are path analogues of the factor 
model shown in Exhibit 3 - were considered. The summary results - chi- 
squared values, degrees of freedom, and the residual term (1 -R  2) for the 
prediction of LAW - are shown in Exhibit 7. 
In the original model - 6A, Exhibit 6 - the estimated values of the affect- 
.75 
Fixed 2 4  
Fixed 2 4  
,34 





LISREL fit statistics: Chi z = 637, (:If = 205 ,  N = 1072. 
Estimated relotionihips (r 's) among exogenous factors I f  = fixed] 
Dt D2 D3 D4 D5 
Domain 2 .57 
Domain 3 .12 . 3 0  
Domain 4 .30 .57 .39 
Domain 5 .49 .51 .23 . 50  




Factor-path model with affect intervening between domains and life-as-a- 
whole (LAW), and with allowance for random and correlated measurement 
errors. 




Affec t  
Exogenous 
(_r replaces _c) 
g paths included 
(free parameter) 
Model 6A (Exhibit 6) 
Chi-square = 637 
d.f. = 205 
(I-R 2) = .2~ 
Model 6C (Not shown) 
Chi-square = 603 
d.f. = 208 
(I-R 2) = .2~ 
g path~ deleted 
ffixed at  zero) 
Model 65 (Not shown) 
Chi-square = 680 
d.f. = 207 
(I-R 21 = .22 
Model 6D (Not shown) 
Chi-square = 625 
d.f. = 209 
(I-R 2) = .21 
Exhibit 7. Measures of fit (chi-squares, degrees of freedom, and variance left unex- 
plained in the LAW factor) for the model of Exhibit 6 and three variants. 
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LAW path coefficients (g) turned out to be small (0.18 and 0.16). An altema- 
tive model, which we shall call '6B', was therefore run to test the effect of 
deleting the g paths by fixing their values at zero. While the increase in chi- 
square more than reflected the increase in the degrees of freedom due to the 
delection of the g paths, we put greater weight in this comparison on the 
external validity of the models as reflected in the residual coefficient (1 -R 2) 
for the prediction of LAW. There was little difference between the models in 
this respect. Thus while Model 6B indicated that any direct effect on LAW 
must be very small, the comparison with 6A showed that affect did not in 
fact make any significant contribution to the prediction of LAW over and 
above that already contained in the domain affects. 9 
Models 6C and 6D are variants of 6A and 6B, respectively, and differ from 
them only in that the affect factors are made exogenous - i.e., the coefficients 
(c paths) for the regression of affect on the domains are replaced by correla- 
tion coefficients (r's). As far as the g path is concerned, comparison of the 
former two models replicates the comparison of the latter and leads to the 
same conclusion, namely that affect makes no direct contribution to the 
LAW factor. However, it is the comparison between the c paths and the r's 
that now concerns us. One of the consequences of making affect an exogenous 
variable can be studied by comparing the set of domain-affect correlations 
from Model 6C with the c path coefficients from Model 6A. (The c path coef- 
ficients for Model 6B were virtually identical.) This is done in Exhibit 8. 
It will be recalled that the domain factors included in these models were 
selected because of the range of covariation that their constituent items 
showed with affect, l~ The correlations in the top half of Exhibit 8 reflect 
this range. There is not only the difference in overall level as between domain 
Domain Factors 
Correlatians (from Model 6C) 
Positive Affect .4g .40 .20 .22 ,14 
Negative Affect -.37 -.37 -.21 -.29 -.36 
Exhibit 8. 
Regression Coefficients. 
( f rom Model 6A) 
Positive Af fec t  .#1 .19 .12 
Negative Af fec t  - .  15 - .  12 -.09 
Links between domain factors and affect. 
.OL .17 
-.0~ - .18 
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factors 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4, but also interesting discrepancies between the 
connections with the two affects. The family domain, for example, is more 
strongly linked to positive than to negative affect, while the reverse applies to 
the relaxation domain. This substantively interesting pattern of association 
disappears when we turn to the regression coefficients in the lower half of 
Exhibit 8. Three of these are near zero, while most of the rest tend to be very 
small. These results lead us to believe that the original correlations are a 
better guide to the relationship between the domains and the affect factors 
than are the path coefficients, and constitute one reason for preferring 
models in which affect is made an exogenous variable. 
Consistent with this preference is the finding that models where affect is 
made exogenous provide a better fit to the observed data than models where 
it is endogenous. The latter models, represented by 6A and 6B in Exhibit 7, 
have larger chi-squares yet smaller degrees of freedom than the comparable 
exogenous models, 6C and 6D, respectively. A decrement in degrees of 
freedom means that more parameters have been estimated, and it is usual to 
find that chi-square decreases, indicating some degree of improvement in fit. 
It is then a question of whether the saving in chi-square points is sufficiently 
greater than the loss of degrees of freedom for the improvement in fit to be 
judged substantial. In this case however chi-square has increased, so that it is 
quite clear that the fit is worse. 
The reasons for the poorer fit of  the endogenous models are instructive. 
Although the path coefficients between the two affect factors were fixed at 
zero, the estimated correlation between them turned out to be 0.13 in 6A 
and 0.16 in Model 6B. The original correlation between the affect scales was 
close to zero, so a large residual was introduced at this point. The spurious 
correlation between the affect factors arises, it would seem, because when 
affect is made endogenous the models assume that both affect factors are 
joint effects of the same causes, namely the domain factors. Here then is a 
further reason for thinking that the assumption of a cause-effect relationship 
between domains and affect is erroneous. 
We may now review the basic assumptions in the original model schematised 
in Exhibit 5. Affect was placed in an intervening position in this model 
because initially it seemed plausible to consider the domain evaluations as a 
set of causes acting together to produce an overall affective response which in 
turn was incorporated into the assessment of global well-being. (It did not 
and does not seem plausible to assume that global affect could be antecedent 
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to and act as a cause of the specific domain evaluations.) However, now that 
the consequences of  assuming affect to occupy an intervening position have 
been made explicit in terms of structural equations, we find this model to be 
untenable. We were led at this point to a model in which affect is made 
exogenous alongside the domain evaluations, and in which affect has no 
direct effect on the assessment of  life-as-a-whole. This model has its short- 
comings, as will be seen, but compared to the intervening position model it 
provides a more adequate as well as a more parsimonious account of the 
observed data. 
Domain-specific affects. A model in which affects and domains are both 
exogenous offers no hypotheses about either the nature of  the associations 
between the domains and affect or the reasons why affect should have no 
direct effect on the assessment of  life-as-a-whole. These two shortcomings of 
the model (there is a third, much more important, to which we shall come 
presently) can be met, at least theoretically, if we postulate that each domain 
item (or domain factor) has associated with it a specific element of  affect. A 
model that incorporates this assumption may be schematised as in Exhibit 9. 
rij 
Exhibit 9. Basic form for path model with global affect explained by domain-specific 
affects, and with life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by domains. 
In Exhibit 9, Ai and A~ are specific elements of affect associated with 
domain factors Di and 1)/. The contribution of the domains to global affect 
can now be interpreted as the joint result of the direct effects bi, b/, of these 
domain-specific affects without needing to postulate direct effects from the 
domain evaluations (the troublesome c paths in Exhibit 5); the correlation 
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between a domain and global affect receives an interpretation as a coordina- 
ting-path effect given by the product e i bi; and the absence of a direct path 
between global affect and LAW can be explained by assuming that the affect 
is already in the domains. Hence the contribution of affect to life-as-a-whole 
is accounted for by the domain-specific affects. 
However plausible, the model in Exhibit 9 must remain untested as we do 
not have measures of  domain-specific affects in any currently available data 
set. Moreover, a major theoretical shortcoming can be seen if we ask what 
else, other than affect, is transmitted along the f paths between domain eva- 
luations and LAW. We know that more than affect is transmitted since the 
domains account for much more variance in LAW than does affect. Our 
theory, of course, says that the missing factor is cognition. Section 3 showed 
how factor models which included the cognitive factor could be constructed 
from the available data. The role of cognition in the judgement process can be 
examined by running the path analogues of these factor models. As will be 
seen in the next section, the models that ensue lead to a view of the under- 
lying dynamics of the judgement process that is very different from that of  
the affect-only model in Exhibit 9. 
4.3 Affect-Cognit ion Models 
The basic characteristics of the model to be considered in this section may be 
schematised as in Exhibit 10. 
Following the work in Section 4.2, affect in Exhibit 10 (again shown as a 
rij f j  tic D ~ _  
Exhibit 10. Basic form for path model life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by affect, 
cognition, and/or domains. 
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single variable for simplicity) is portrayed as exogenous and linked to the 
domains Dt and D i by the correlations r/a and ria. A cognitive factor has been 
introduced and is also treated as exogenous, being linked to the domains by 
correlations r/c and tic. The path from cognition to the LAW factor is denoted 
by h. The paths from the domains are denoted by 3~,//, and the path from 
affect by g as previously (Exhibit 5). 
If the paths 3~ and 3~ from the domains are set equal to zero in the model 
in Exhibit I0, then the input to LAW would consist of two parts - affect and 
cognition. The paths g and h would be unaffected by the domain evaluations, 
so that the relations between affect, cognition, and LAW could be modelled 
without reference to the domains. 
To anticipate, the discovery that paths j~ and/~ really would be zero in this 
model was the main outcome of the attempt to implement the model of 
Exhibit 10. 
Cognition as residual variance in the LAW factor. It was not immediately 
obvious, but on reflection it was realised that the lack of a direct effect of 
domains on the LAW factor 0 c paths equal to zero) is implicit in the defini- 
tion of the cognitive factor. The nature of the implication can be clarified by 
considering the results for a path model that includes cognition, affect, and 
LAW, but excludes the domain evaluations. Exhibit 11 shows the results of 
estimating the parameters of such a model using the LISREL program.X 1 
The validity coefficients for the affect measures and the loadings of the 
7 - -  =. 
All exogenous factors statistical ly independent. 
Exhibit 11. Factor-path model with life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by affect and 
cognition, and with allowance for random and correlated measurement 
e r r o r s .  
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global measures on the method factor in Exhibit 11 are a little different from 
the values subsequently found to be optimum for these coefficients (see 
Andrews and McKennell, 1978). Otherwise the results in Exhibit 11 serve 
very well to bring out the salient theoretical issues raised by models of this 
general type. 
Exhibit 11 portrays a causal structure relating unobserved variables in 
which the LAW factor is the endogenous variable being predicted. But no 
residual coefficient is allowed for the LAW factor. The cognition factor is 
really acting here as a residual input. This accords with the operational defini- 
tion of cognition that we have had to follow in order to proceed with the 
analysis: Cognition is the factor responsible for that part of the variation in 
measures of  global well-being which remains after the contributions of  affect 
and method components have been removed. In non-causal factor models, 
such as those in Exhibits 2a and 3a, cognition could be factored directly out 
of  the observed variables, and its contribution to these variables determined, 
because the causal relationship between the factors were not under study. For 
the causal influence of cognition on the LAW factor to be studied, however, 
cognition must be defined independently of  both the LAW factor and the 
variables used to define this factor. The strategem of obtaining cognition by 
residualising out of the LAW factor seems reasonable enough if we can accept, 
first, that the model has succeeded, as intended, in stripping away random and 
correlated errors in the measurement of the LAW factor and, second, that the 
variance then unaccounted for by affect must be ascribed to cognition. 
The most important outcome of estimating the model of Exhibit 11 is the 
very substantial g paths for the inputs from affect to the LAW factor. These 
contrast with the very small g paths described in Section 4.2 for models 
without cognition (Exhibits 6 and 10) and will be interpreted shortly. 
Cognition as residual variance in the LA Ir indicators. Because we have a 
set of six global indicators an alternative strategem is to obtain the cognitive 
factor by residualising affect out of some of these indicators while using the 
remaining ones to define the LAW factor as before. However, residualising 
cognition out of  the indicators of  LAW is not so very different from residu- 
alising it out of the LAW factor itself, and cannot be expected to alter the 
main outcome. The alternative strategem was in fact adopted for the model in 
Exhibit 12. (We may note that the model in Exhibit 12 and a variant derived 
later are both path analogues of  the model in Exhibit 4, that a cognitive 
factor was also defined in the models in Exhibit 2a and 3a, and that for all of 
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these models the loadings of the global indicators on the cognitive factor vary 
very little, and hence give this factor a constant meaning throughout.) 
In the model of Exhibit 12 it can be seen that the g paths from positive 
and negative affect are again substantial. We were also concerned to examine 
the role of  the domain evaluations along with cognition and affect in the total 
causal structure) 2 The paths from the domain factors to LAW were left as 
. 3 6 - ~  Fomily life ~T4 
.64--~ Sex life , ~ .  
.52- -~  Fomi|y octs. ~ 6 < ? .  
.4"r--- I Income tfom.) ~,~ 
. 2 5 - ~  Not. gov.  ~'~'~.e2 ~ o ,  
.42-~Po, .  leoders J " - - ~ . 7 1 ~  
- -I  .eco,,o+ I----  m - -  
.6~ ~ Rec. plocu 
.66--~ Goods a ,,.-,.J ̀ ' - '~m+ 
.72 / 
.57 ~ Ti me do lhirqs ~"'~]11:~+7 ~ +   . 
. 7 4 - ~  I Sleep Fi~ed 3 J ~  
+6- - - [  P,'ivocy ) 
LISREL fit statistics: Chi2=591, df = 196, 
Exhibit 12. 
Fixed B7 









+A -~ Cog 
Affect neg. f.EX~ 
Cognition f.O0 f.O0 
Domain t .46 - .38  .51 
Oomoin 2 . 4 0 - . 3 7  .43 
Oomoin 3 .20- .21 04 
Domain 4 .22 ".30 .20 
Domain 5 .19 -.36 .34 
T-p!. told. f .O0 
N : 1072 
(r's) among exogenous factors If = fixed] 
Dl D2 D3 04 D5 
.56 
. t l  .29 
.29 .57 .39 
.49 .51 2 2  .50 
f~X) f.O0 f.OO f~O f,O0 f,O0 f.CX:) 
Factor-path model with life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by affect, cogni- 
tion, and/or domains, and with allowance for random and correlated mea- 
surement errors. 
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free parameters to be estimated by the model. As can be seen in Exhibit 12 
the estimates for these path coefficients approximated zero in all cases. We 
therefore ran the model again with these paths f~xed at zero. The results were 
very similar. Since the newmodel (not shown) had five fewer paths, its degrees 
of freedom were five points higher, and since its chi-square value increased by 
only about the same amount, there was a clear indication that the parameters 
linking the domains to the LAW factor in the model of Exhibit 12 did not 
produce any real statistical improvement in the fit of  the model. The true 
value of these parameters in this model, equivalent to the f paths in Exhibit 
10, can therefore be taken as zero. 
The value for the paths linking positive affect, negative affect, and cogni- 
tion to the LAW factor in our revised model were, respectively, 0.54, 0.44 
and 0.72, - only slightly different from the values for the model in Exhibit 12. 
It is notable, too, that these values are very near those obtained for the model 
of Exhibit 11, which did not include the domains. (The minor differences are 
most probably due to the differences in the method effects.) We see again, 
therefore, that the domain assessments can even be excluded from the causal 
model without altering the estimates for the direct effects of cognition and 
affect on the LAW factor. 
We conclude that in models that incorporate both affect and cognition 
factors, and that define cognition as a residual, the flow of influences deter- 
mining the LAW assessments will be by way of the cognitive and affective 
factors. 
Domain-specific cognitions. As with the affect-only model, the correlations 
between the domains and affect remain unanalysed in the affect-cognition 
model. But the affect-cognition model has a cognition factor as well as affect 
in the exogenous position. The theory of domain-specific affects, presented in 
Section 4.2, now needs to be extended if an interpretation is to be provided 
for the domain-cognition correlations as well as the domain-affect correla- 
tions. We therefore postulate the existence of domain-specific cognitions. A 
model that incorporates the assumption of domain-specific affects and 
domain-specific cognitions may be schematised as in Exhibit 13. 
In Exhibit 13, A i and A i are specific elements of affect, and Ci and C i are 
specific elements of cognition associated with, respectively, domain factors 
Di and Dj. The correlation between a domain D~ and global affect receives an 
interpretation as a coordinating path effect given by the product eibi; and the 
correlation between a domain and global cognition as the coordinating path 
kill. 






Exhibit 13. Basic form for path model with exogenous domain-specific affects and 
cognitions, and with global affect and global cognition intervening between 
domains and life-as-a-whole (LAW). 
4.4 Evaluation of  Affect-LA W versus Affect-Cognition Models 
According to whether we adopt the affect-LAW or affect-cognition model as 
an explanation for well-being evaluations, we arrive at very different conclu- 
sions about the role played by affect and by domain evaluations. Comparisons 
of these models will be facilitated if the main outcomes of the detailed dis- 
cussions in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are presented in schematic form as in Exhibits 
14a and 14b. 
The schema show the domain factors D i and 19/along with by-now familiar 
concepts of the study, affect, cognition, and life-as-a-whole (LAW). The ovals 
round each variable are intended to convey that it is the relationship between 
factors or unobserved variables that are under study - random and correlated 
errors (methods effects) have been allowed for and so do not enter into the 
comparison. Exhibits 14a and 14b may be regarded as schema for Model 6D 
(Exhibit 7) and the model in Exhibit 12, respectively, which show in detail 
how the allowance was made. 
rio i 
ric 
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Exhibit 14a. Basic form for path model with life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by 
domains and with affect exogenous - the 'Affect-LAW' model. 
Exhibit 14b. Basic form for path model with life-as-a-whole (LAW) explained by affect 
and cognition, and with domains exogenous - the Affect-Cognition model. 
It is possible to argue, on only statistical grounds, that the affect-cognition 
model is preferable in that that introduction o f  a cognitive factor does pro- 
vide a marginally better fit to the observed data (as demonstrated in Section 
3). However, the substantive implications of  the paths in the models provide 
even more compelling reasons for preferring the affect-cognition model. 
There are at least two such implications. First, there is the absent g path in 
Exhibit 14a. The implication here is that respondents asked to evaluate their 
life-as-a-whole do not take into account their, as it were, 'gut feelings' about 
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the emotional quality of their life. This is intuitively difficult to accept. The 
substantial g path in the affect-cognition model, on the other hand, suggests 
that respondents' sense of the emotional quality of their life is a factor that 
has a direct impact, whether it be conscious or unconscious, on evaluations of 
life-as-a-whole, even if it is not the only factor. 
A second source of difficulty with the affect-only model relates to the 
implication that the f paths have for a cognitive factor. The model requires 
that the influence of affect is transmitted along the/'paths. But dearly more 
than affect is being transmitted because the domains account for much varia- 
tion in LAW beyond the contribution of affect. If we ask what else is being 
transmitted, we are led back to the postulation of cognition. It did not prove 
possible to integrate a cognitive factor into the affect-only model without 
arriving at the quite different affect-cognition model in which the f paths 
turned out to be zero. It is not a case of one model being a development out 
of the other. The two seem incompatible. 
If the above theory about the existence and role of a cognitive factor is 
correct, therefore, the affect-cognition model seems preferable to the affect- 
only mcdel. However, whether people do in fact form evaluation of life-as-a- 
whole by 'combining' some sense of global affective evaluation with some 
global cognitive evaluation (as the affect-cognition model postulates), or 
whether some other mechanism that might more directly involve combining 
domain evaluations (which might themselves already incorporate certain 
domain-specific affects and cognitions) is used, is not something that can be 
defmitdy determined with the available data. Our modelling analyses are 
helpful in showing the implications of different theoretical approaches and 
have suggested the desirability of obtaining certain further types of data in 
the future 0.e., measures of domain-specific affects, domain-specific cogni- 
tions, and global cognition). But, as in any modelling activity, the results we 
have obtained are dependent on the particular models that have been examined. 
The absence of observed measures of global cognition and the consequent 
necessity for us to def'me it as a residual, and the absence of any data on 
affects or cognitions linked to specific life concerns and hence the impossibi- 
lity of including these in our models, may well have influenced the results we 
have obtained. 
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5. O T H E R  D A T A  S E T S  
5.1 British Data 
A survey of perceived well-being in Britain by Abrams and Hall (Abrams, 
1976; Hall, 1976) utilised the Bradburn affect scales and a range of domain 
evaluations together with a large and varied set of global indicators of life 
quality. From the perspective of the present paper it is important to note that 
the affect-cognition model fitted the British data very much better than did 
the affect-LAW model, thereby replicating the essential result obtained with 
the American data, as described in Section 3. 
Hail (1975) has reported a path analysis of the British data in which the 
affect scales were introduced as intervening variables as in Exhibit 5 above. 
Six domain-evaluation measures were employed in this analysis: Family, 
Living standard, Health, Financial situation, Job, and Leisure. An almost 
identical set of six domains, along with Bradburn's affect scales and a global 
measure of life-as.a-whole, could be selected from one of the data sets in the 
Andrews-Withey series - their November 1972 Form 2 national survey 
(Andrews and Withey, 1976). It proved possible therefore to replicate Hall's 
analysis exactly with these American data. 
There was an impressive similarity in the main structural features of the 
results. First, the direct effects of the affect measures on the global evaluations 
were equally small. The path coefficients (the g paths in Exhibit 5) for posi- 
tive and negative affect, respectively, were 0.13 and 0.12 in the British data 
and 0.10 and 0.11 in the American data. 13 The variance explained in the 
measure of global well-being was high, with anR 2 of near 0.50 in both analyses 
but the direct contribution of the affect paths to this prediction was negli- 
gible, as implied by their miniscule path coefficients. (See also McKennell, 
1978, Table IV.) This is not so elaborate an analysis as the one pursued with the 
American data in Section 3, since no allowance was made for random or 
correlated errors in the observed variables, ~4 but it is adequate to show that 
the first main finding regarding the intervening variable model for affect 
demonstrated in Section 4.2 holds for the British data just as it does for the 
American: The path from affect to the global measure, the g path in Exhibit 
5, is small and can be eliminated without loss of explanatory power. 
The second main finding in Section 4.2 was that the paths from the 
domain evaluations to the affect factors, the c paths in Exhibit 5, need to be 
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replaced by correlational links. This result emerges even more conclusively 
when Hall's model is replicated with the American data. The variance in each 
affect measure explained by the set of domains is small (R 2 less than 0.20) in 
both the British and American data sets. However, the most important 
finding is that the coefficients for most of the paths from domains to affect 
(the c paths in Exhibit 5) were less than 0.10. Yet in both sets of data the 
domain-affect correlations were mostly subsantial, at or above 0.20. It is diffi- 
cult to believe that activities in such areas as family, leisure, and job generate 
no affect or hardly any affect. It is easier to believe that the original correla- 
tions are a better guide to the relationships between the domains and affect than 
are the path coefficients. We are thus led, as with the discussions of Exhibit 8 
in Section 4.2, to a preference for a model in which affect is made an exoge- 
nous variable. We thus replicate with British data, albeit at a simplified level, 
the two principal conclusions drawn from the more elaborate analyses of 
American data. 
In Section 4.2 a further theoretical development was presented which 
sought to explain the absence of c and g paths by positing that each domain 
evaluation was associated with a domain-specific element of affect. Although 
this theory cannot be tested directly, since we do not have domain-specific 
affect measures, some indirect evidence is forthcoming from running the 
regressions implied by Hall's model, and its Andrews-Withey replication, in 
stepwise fashion, adding one domain at a time. For the prediction of global 
well-being (LAW), the domains were allowed to enter only after first forcing 
in the affect measures. The two affect measures being uncorrelated, the values 
of g before any domains were added were the original correlation of each 
affect scale with the global measure: 0.25 for positive affect and 0.37 for 
negative affect in the Abrams-Hall data (0.36 and 0.32, respectively, in the 
Andrews-Withey data). The value o fg  then fell rapidly with the first domains 
that entered the stepwise regression and then more slowly as further domains 
are added until there was no decrement detectable (in the second decimal 
place) for the last few domains. So similar were the results that the curve for 
the decline of g as domains were added in the Abrams-Hall data could be 
almost exactly superimposed on the plot for the Andrews-Withey data. ~ s The 
behaviour of the g path here as domains were added is consistent with the 
theory that affect adds little to the power of the domains to predict life-as-a- 
whole because the elements of affect are already contained in the domain 
evaluations. As domains are added, it would seem that affect elements are 
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added also, until the point where the entire contribution of global affect is 
accounted for. 
5.2 NORC's American Data 
The above analyses of the data from British and American surveys was espe- 
cially valuable because of the near identity that could be secured in the set of 
variables examined. Burr et al. (1978) have published analyses of a correlation 
matrix for NORC data between ten domain satisfaction measures, Bradburn's 
affect scales, and two global measures of well-being. Unfortunately, the set of 
domains overlaps only partially with the sets just discussed, and is much lower 
in predictive power, 16 no doubt in part because the important Family 
domain is not included. Nevertheless, when the stepwise regression just 
described was repeated with the NORC data, the same two basic structural 
characteristics of the result emerged: (1) The affect measures did not add to 
the predictive power of the domains in explaining the variance in the global 
indicators. In stepwise regression most of the variance in global satisfaction 
was accounted for by the first two domains to enter, and the values of the g 
coefficients rapidly fell to a very low value (0.11) as further domains were 
added. (2) Only three domains had Beta coefficients (c paths in Figure 5) 
greater than 0.10 in the prediction of affect (0.13, 0.17, and 0.22). Despite 
some apparent substantive differences, therefore, the NORC data set again 
replicates the basic structural characteristics noted in the other surveys of 
perceived quality of lifeJ 7 
6. S U M M A R Y  A N D  D I S C U S S I O N  
Our starting point for this program of secondary analysis of data from quality 
of life surveys lay in the observation that ratings of happiness and life satis- 
faction often correlate differently with outside variables such as age, income, 
and education. A special analysis of data from the cross-tabulation of happi- 
ness against satisfaction ratings supported the interpretation that the former 
were more affective and the latter more cognitive. At the same time, the 
analysis also suggested that these two types of measures, in common with 
other currently-used rating-scale indicators of perceived well-being, were 
compounds of both cognition and affect, and differed only marginally in the 
extent to which one or the other of these factors was being tapped. A 
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measure of affect was available in the scales developed by Bradbum (1969), 
but there was no measure of cognition. We therefore conceived the idea of 
operationally defining cognition in terms of the variance that remained in 
global indicators of well-being after that due to affect and two types of  
measurement error had been partially out. The initial ideas were set out in a 
paper by McKennell (1978). The present paper develops a series of structural 
equation models in which the logical consequences of the assumptions under- 
lying these ideas are made explicit. 
In Section 3, models containing a cognitive factor were compared with 
models that did not. This comparison was made for models of increasing 
complexity. Beginning with models that contained only global indicators plus 
factors for affect and life-as-a-whole, we proceeded to models in which domain 
evaluations were added, and f'mally to models which also added a cognition 
factor. Through this series of models, the loadings on the cognition factor and 
the loadings on the other factors changed little. Despite its status as a residual 
factor, defined in terms of  its structural relations with other variables rather 
than through its own indicators, the cognition factor retained a consistent 
meaning across the separate models. Moreover, in all the major comparisons, 
models that contained the cognition factor fitted the data better than models 
that did not. 
Thus encouraged, we moved on from the static picture of the factor struc- 
ture of well-being, in Section 3, to consider more dynamic models, in Section 
4, that sought to portray the flow of determining influences between factors. 
It is worth looking back at this point to the notions about the dynamics of  
the judgement process that prevailed, and which we shared with others, at the 
time we came into the present investigation. Previous investigators (notably 
Andrews and Withey, 1976; Campbell etal., 1976) had discussed the way the 
LAW factor or its indicators can be predicted by a linear summation of  
separate domain evaluations. For the most part, the emphasis in these discus- 
sions was on statistically accounting for the variance in global well-being 
measures. Andrews and Withey (1976, pp 108-109),  however, briefly sug- 
gested that 
the statistical model can also be considered a psychological model. Not only is the model 
that method of combining feelings that provided the best predictions, it is also our best 
indication of what may go on in the minds of the respondents when they themselves 
combine feelings about specific life concerns to arrive at global evaluations. Thus, our 
statistical model can also be considered as a simulation of psychological processes. 
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A model was postulated in which domain evaluation factors were portrayed 
as direct dertermining influences for life-as-a-whole assessments (see Andrews 
and Withey 1976, Exhibit 6.4). 
Although the precise sense in which this model simulated psychological 
processes was not spelled out, the model might be justified as a representation 
of the unconscious workings of the schemata in the minds of respondents. 
However, the attempt in Section 4.2 of the present paper to integrate global 
affect into the domain-LAW model led to consequences which were intuitively 
difficult to accept. On the other hand, the attempt in Section 4.3 to integrate 
both global affect and global cognition led to a more appealing model, but 
one in which the assumption that the domains have a direct causal impact on 
LAW assessment had to be abandoned. 
To recapitulate briefly, the affect-LAW model considered in Section 4.2 
kept the original feature in which the domains were assumed to have a direct 
causal impact on the LAW assessments, while attempting to explain the 
correlation that occurs between affect and LAW. One possible interpretation 
of this correlation would be that, when asked to assess their feelings of global 
well-being, respondents actively and consciously take into account the emo- 
tional quality of their lives. If this had been the case, however, the model 
should have shown a direct effect in terms of causal paths running from the 
affect factors to the LAW factor. In running the model, however, we found 
that if such paths were included in this model, their influences were so small 
that they made no significant contribution to the explanation of variance in the 
LAW factor. The affect variables, in other words, added nothing to the vari- 
ance in the LAW factor that was not already accounted for by the domain 
evaluations. 
Moreover, we found clear evidence that a model which placed global affect 
as an intervening variable between the domain factors and the LAW factor 
yielded a poorer fit to the data than did a model which positioned global 
affect as an exogenous variable - correlated with, but not directly influenced 
by, the domain assessments. 
It is possible to interpret the role of affect here by saying that its influence 
is somehow entailed in the action of the domains, and to this explanation we 
return shortly. A main conclusion from our analysis of  the affect-LAW model 
is that in this model there is no direct path between affect and LAW. It is this 
consequence of the affect-LAW model that is intuitively difficult to accept. 
Since the initial domain-LAW model, which assumes that domain evaluations 
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are direct causes of LAW assessments, leads to this consequence, it too is put 
in doubt. 
Section 4.3 attempted to integrate both a cognitive factor as well as affect 
into the basic domain-LAW model. The consequences of this attempt was a 
model, the affect-cognition model, which was incompatible either with the 
basic domain-LAW model or its extension into the affect-LAW model. For in 
the affect-cognition model we found the paths denoting a direct impact 
between domain evaluations and LAW become redundant. All the non-error 
variance in LAW could be explained as the joint effects of cognition and 
affect. While this was a direct result of the way cognition had been def'med 
(i.e., as a residual), the effect - surprising at first - was that in this model 
the correlation between the domain factors and LAW came about indirectly 
through the correlation the domains had with cognition and affect. 
If  this affect-cognition model were to be accepted, then the basic domain- 
LAW model would have to be rejected. On intuitive and substantive grounds 
there are some appealing aspects to the affect-cognition model. The path 
between affect and LAW is restored, and this seems intuitively reasonable. 
But now there is a second path from cognition. The model states that in 
arriving at global assessments of life quality respondents weigh directly both 
affective and cognitive considerations, so that the final assessment is a com- 
pound of the two. This accords with our original theorising. As far as this 
model is concerned, global assessments can be obtained quite separately from 
the domain evaluations. This accords with the facts. If we ask for domain 
evaluations respondents can give them, and if we call for global assessments, 
we can get these also. It seems that these are distinct approaches to quality of  
life that may not be consciously connected by our respondents at the time 
they respond to the survey questions. The connection is made theoretically 
and statistically by us as investigators. As far as our respondents are con- 
cemed, there is an important sense in which the global assessments are 
domain-free, and the affect-cognition model incorporates this feature. 
The linear additive relation that exists between domain evaluations and 
global assessments of life quality has been seen by previous investigators as a 
major piece of  evidence for the construct validity of their measures. Nothing 
written here changes that verdict. But the status of the relationship requires 
further explication. The hypothesis was suggested (see Exhibit 13) that asso- 
ciated with each domain is a domain-specific element of  affect and, similarly, 
a domain-specific element of cognition. Thus, by summing the domains one 
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would sum the elements of affect and the elements of cognition until the 
contribution of global affect and global cognition to the global assessment of 
well-being would be accounted for statistically. This hypothesis is consistent 
with the position that it is the global affect and global cognition and not the 
domain evaluations that have the direct impact on the Final LAW assessment 
- i.e., this hypothesis says that the contribution of the domains is indirect via 
their associations with global affect and global cognition. 
The associations between the domains and global affect and global cogni- 
tion also need interpreting in their turn. The hypothesised model (Exhibit 13) 
was constructed so that there are no direct paths between the domains and 
either global affect or cognition. The association here is also indirect via the 
domain-specific elements of affect and cognition. This is in line with what we 
know about respondents' ability to make global assessments of affect without 
apparently making immediate reference to evaluations of particular domains. 
The essence of Bradburn's achievement in developing his affect scales was to 
have operationalised the concept of global affect by means of  domain-free 
measures. Whether or not the concept of global cognition can be operatio- 
nalised in similar terms remains to be seen. 
We know little about the cognitive factor other than the way it operates in 
the models we have constructed. Certainly we would like to know more. But 
these models do provide some construct validity. The definition of a factor in 
terms of the residual variance it can account for is a common operation in 
conventional factor analysis of the exploratory kind. The confirmatory mode 
of  factor analysis followed in this paper provides a more direct route to 
construct validity. Factor axes are positioned not through arbitrary rotation 
procedures but in terms of the identification constraints imposed by a theore- 
tical model. Moreover, in second-order confirmatory factor analysis (produ- 
cing what we have termed factor-path models) the factors are put to use in 
models which seek to explain the relationship between them. The relative 
value of a particular model in relation to alternatives is then assessed in terms 
of both goodness of fit and substantive interpretation. There is every reason 
to suppose that the interpretation that can be placed on factors in models that 
survive this process will have construct validity. 
An interpretation that can be placed on the affect-cognition model is that 
the causal pathways in it might represent the respondents' mental processes 
during the interview situation, whereas the correlational links between varia- 
bles left exogenous in the model might be set up in the respondents' minds by 
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their previous life experiences outside the interview situation. Thus, this 
model would suggest that respondents actively integrate global affect and 
global cognition in arriving at their global assessment of live quality. However, 
the linkages that assessments of life-as-a-whole have with the domain evalu- 
ations would depend on the associations domains have with global affect and 
global cognition by way of the domain-specific affects and cognitions, linkages 
which stem from an individual's living experiences prior to the interview. 
Thus this model is quite consistent with the finding that a linear additive 
combination of the domain assessments can be used to predict LAW assess- 
ments, but it posits very different account of the psychological processes 
entailed in the connection. 
It is a task for future research to attempt to construct direct indicators for 
global cognition which will be domain-free and analogous to the scales that 
Bradbum has devised for the measurement of affect. It is too early to say 
what these indicators will look like. As was discussed by McKennell (1978), 
the way forward may be through the study of different types of comparison 
criteria - values, standards, aspirations, goals - in the assessment of global 
well-being, A beginning has been made here in the work of Abrams (1975), 
Hall (1975), Mason and Faulkenberry (1978) and Bortner and Hutsch (1973). 
So far no generalised measure corresponding to the cognition factor has been 
devised, though this has not been among the objectives of the investigators. 
Andrews and Withey (1976) proposed a Domain-by-Criteria Model which so 
far has been little researched. The criteria in their list were quite general (for 
example, amount of challenge, privacy, comfort, fun, variety and diversity, 
independence and freedom, responsibility, and so forth). The model assumed 
that people evaluated the criteria in relation to the domains (or vice versa), 
but both the criteria and domains could also be investigated independently. 
Further study of the framework of criteria in the context of such a model 
might throw further light on the cognitive factor. Bradbum's research showed, 
surprisingly, that the measurement of affect required two factors. There was 
no problem in incorporating this two dimensional concept in our models. For 
convenience we have treated global cognition as a single factor. But we would 
not be surprised if several factors proved necessary to cover the concept, nor 
would we anticipate any difficulty in principle in exetending our models to 
cover multiple dimensions of cognition. 
At the present stage of research, the notions of domain-specific affect and 
domain-specific cognition remain purely hypothetical. But it should prove 
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possible to operationalise these concepts so that the models in which they 
appear can be tested empirically. With respect to domain-specific cognition, 
the most illuminating study that we have up to now of  the working of com- 
parison standards was made within the specific domain of housing satisfaction 
(Campbell etal., 1976, Chapter 6). These investigators have recently em- 
barked on a survey in which comparison standards in several other domains 
are being subjected to similar intensive study. Is It may prove possible to 
obtain an integrated measure (or measures) of domain-specific cognition from 
such work. The construction of measures of  domain-specific affect is also a 
task for the future. Here the tradition of research on job satisfaction affords 
many suggestions, though it also presents problems, and does not provide 
any immediately available measures in which cognition and affect are covered 
separately. Although the concepts of  cognition and affect have a considerable 
intellectual history within psychology (McKennell, 1978), investigators of  
subjective well-being must look to their own research to clarify the distinc- 
tion as it applies to their own field. 
It is hoped that the present model-building approach will contribute to the 
development of theory in quality of life research. The approach forces a level 
of specificity in theoretical thinking which is not often achieved in the absence 
of a specific model. Above all, the models have heuristic value. They make 
explicit the logical consequences of the assumptions underlying theoretical 
formulations, and where information is not yet available for testing a crucial 
model, the very exercise of  specifying that model serves to identify the 
precise type of information that is needed, thereby pointing the direction in 
which future research should go. 
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a Models of this form are sometimes referred to as 'confirmatory' or 'restricted' factor 
analysis models (e.g., Joreskog, 1969; Boruch and Wolins, 1970). For further discussion of 
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the application of this form of the LISREL model to the estimation of the reliabflities 
and validities of measures of well-being, see Andrews and Withey (1976, Chapter 6), also 
McKenneU et al, (1978). The more general LISREL procedure is sometimes referred to 
as 'second-order confirmatory factor analysis' (Burt, 1973). 
3 According to Long (1976, pp. 171-172) ,  chi=square can be applied as a test statistic 
only for the differentiation between Mested' models. Models are nested when the one 
with fewer free parameters (higher degrees of freedom, d o ) has no parameters other than 
those present in the less restrictive model (degrees of freedom dl ). Under these condi- 
tions the difference between the chi-square values is itself distributed as chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to d 0-d I . However, in our experience, even where these condi- 
tions are met, the probability levels associated with differences in ehi-square are of limited 
usefuiness when models are estimated using data from relatively large numbers of respon- 
dents. Modifications in the direction of parsimony tend to be ruled out simply because 
the more complex model (that fits more parameters and that has fewer degrees of freedom) 
usually yields a smaller chi-square, and almost invariably, with large samples, the differ- 
ence will be statistically significant. One is again led back to the descriptive or exploratory 
use of the chi-square statistic in which changes in chi-square are assessed qualitatively in 
relation to the shift in degrees of freedom. 
The results of a confirmatory factor analysis of items from Bradburn's (1969) affect 
scales together with five indicators of global well-being have been presented previously 
by McKenneli (1978, Table Ill). The model in Exhibit 2a differs from this earlier one in 
that the correlation between the cognitive and the affect factors has been fixed at zero, 
the loadings on the method factor have been fixed at values ascertained in separate 
analyses (Andrews and McKeffnell, 1978, Exhibit 3), a sixth global indicator - the Ther- 
mometer scale - has been introduced, and the affect scales rather than their constituent 
items have been used as inputs (see Andrews and McKannell, 1978, Section 5.1, especially 
Notes 6 and 7). Throughout this present paper a decision has been made to simplify the 
relationships between the affect and cognitive factors by treating them as orthogonal; 
however, elsewhere we have described some effects of allowing these factors to be 
correlated (Andrews and McKenneil, 1978, Section 5.3). 
s A few, not  very extensive, replications were made of the comparisons between the 
affect-cognition and affect-LAW models in Figures 2a and 2b for subgroups of the total 
sample. Comparisons were made for two small subgroups: people with high socioecono- 
mic status (SES) who were aged thirty or over (N=140), and low SES people aged thirty 
or over (N:100) .  For these small subgroups it was found that although there was a 
decrease in Chi-square on moving from the affect-LAW to the affect-cognition model, the 
saving in chi-square points was not greater than the drop in degrees of freedom. A similar 
comparison between models was also made for two large subgroups: Males (N=440) and 
females (N=580). For females the decrease in chi-square points (36) was substantially 
greater than the saving in degrees of freedom (10); for males the decrease (12) was only 
slightly greater than the saving in degrees of freedom (10). While the results for the two 
larger subgroups, particularly the females, replicates the result in the total sample that 
favored the affect-cognition model, the results for the two smaller subgroups did not. 
However, these small subgroups are particularly subject to sampling instability and the 
sensitivety of the chi-square difference test to sample size. 
For convenience in later graphical displays, this paper will use 'domain' to refer to all 
types specific life concerns. This usage differs from that of Andrews and Withey (1976) 
who distinguished two types of life concerns - domains and criteria. 
Burt et  ai. (1978) have argued that only one satisfaction with domains factor is 
necessary to model the structure of well-being. We have preferred to use several domain 
factors, however, on the following grounds: The set of fifteen domains considered in this 
paper was designed to sample the perceptual space established by a comprehensive 
mapping of domains (see Andrews and Withey, 1976, Chapter 2); factor analyses of an 
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adequate set of domains have previously established the existence of several factors 
(see Andrews and Withey, 1976, Exhibit E.2); the chi-square value of 2255 for 229 
degrees of freedom that was obtained for a model fitted to only one summed-domain 
factor compared very poorly to the fit obtained with a comparable model in which the 
domains were decomposed into factors (i.e., in the model of Exhibit 6); the separate 
domain factors correlate differentially in substantively interesting ways with positive and 
negative affect; and, finally, it makes substantive sense to make room in our models for 
the possibility that different individuals or groups or cultures may vary in the weighting 
given to separate domain factors. 
7 The correlations with the affect scales of the items in domain factors 2, 3, and 4 - as 
designated in Figure 3a - are, respectively, on average, 0.24, 0.13 and 0.12. Correlations 
with positive and negative affect were about equal in strength (but opposite in sign). For 
the items on domain factor 1, on the other hand, the average correlation with positive 
affect was 0.27 and with negative affect 0.21. For factor 5, the corresponding average 
correlations were 0.08 and 0.19. 
s McKennell also discussed and made tentative parameter estimates for a simplified 
model that placed affect measures in an exogenous position while using a single composite 
variable, ~C, the summed domain evaluations, to represent the domains (see MeKennell, 
1978, Figure 7). In the course of the work leading to the present paper, a more complex 
version of this model was run which included the life-as-a-whole factor and a method 
factor as well as a summed-domain factor. The obtained parameter values were very 
near those estimated by MeKennell. This model was run first with paths from affect to 
the LAW factor (g paths) again with these paths deleted. As has been found consistently, 
deletion of the g paths did not increase the residual coefficient for the prediction of the 
LAW factor. 
9 This result accords with the finding from regression runs with the observed variables (see 
the discussion relative to Table IV in McKennell, 1978). There is an apparent anomaly in 
the comparison between Models 6A and 6B (which occurs again in the comparison of 
Models 6C and 6D) in that adding in affect as a predictor appears to lead to a small 
increment in the size of the residual coefficient for LAW. This is believed to result from 
minute changes in the definition of the constituent factors in the model. It should be 
stressed that these changes are very small (visible only as shifts here and there in the 
second decimai place of the loadings on some of the factors). The changes in the residual 
coefficients are of approximately the same order as their standard errors. The correct 
inference therefore appears to be one of no difference between these residual coeffi- 
cients. 
10 See Note 6 for the averaged correlations of the items in the factors with the affect 
scales. The correlations for the factors in Exhibit 8 are higher due to the correction for 
random error, but the pattern of correlation is preserved. 
i t The model of Exhibit 11 is an implementation of the model in Figure 6 in McKennell 
(1978). 
1~ Two other kinds of path models containing a cognitive factor were also examined. In 
both of these the cognitive factor was made the endogenous variable being predicted. 
The first was the path analogue of the model shown in Exhibit 3a. The second was a 
kind of hybrid mid-way between the latter and model 6C (considered in Exhibit 7, but 
without the g path), in that affect was not factored out of the domains but only out of 
the global indicators. Both these trial models fitted the data fairly well. (Chi-square 
equalled 507 with 178 degrees of freedom on the first case and 562 with 197 degrees of 
freedom in the second.) However, both were rejected for several reasons. First, on the 
ground of external validity: The residual coefficient for the prediction of the cognitive 
factor was high, 0.48 in the first case and 0.32 in the second; These values compared 
unfavourably with the 0.24 coefficient obtained for Model 6C in Exhibit 7. Secondly, 
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because in the hybrid model the loadings of the global indicators on the cogriitive factor 
changed from those found previously, thereby altering the meaning of this factor. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most important, because it was not  clear what the substantive interpretation 
of either of these models could be in causal terms. 
13 Variables have been reversed to provide natural scoring. 
14 The British data does not allow much analysis of the way observed measures relate to 
their underlying factors. However, the broad structural constancies under discussion can 
be added to other evidence derived from the analysis of data on life quality from English- 
and French-speaking Canadians (McKennell et  al. ,  1978), which suggests that similar 
measurement procedures, at least when applied by efficient survey organisations, will 
yield measures with much the same error and validity components despite cultural and 
even language differences. 
is For the Abrams-Hall data the first four domains to enter the stepwise regression, in 
order of entry, were Standard of Living (0.23), Leisure (0.22), Finance (0.16), and 
Family Life (0.12) (final Beta coefficients in brackets). For the Andrews-Withey data the 
order was Family Life (0.29), Standard of Living (0.16), Job (0.13), and Spare Time 
Activities (0.13). These four domains accounted for 47 per cent of the variance in the 
LAW measure in the Abrams-Hall data and 53 per cent in the Andrews-Withey data. 
1~ In the NORC data set (Burr e t  al. ,  1978) the R 2 for the prediction of positive and 
negative affect from the domain measures was 0.05 and 0.08 respectively. For the pre- 
diction of the global satisfaction measure from affect and the domains the R 2 was 0.30. 
The first four domains to enter into the stepwise prediction of global satisfaction (after 
forcing in affect) were Leisure (0.22), Finance (0.17), Housing (0.10) and Work (0.13) 
in order of entry (final Beta coefficients in brackets). 
1~ An attempt to replicate the factor model published by Burr et  al., (1978) was 
abandoned when it was discovered that this model was not identified (see Burt et  al. ,  
(1978). A comparison of an affect-LAW versus an affect-cognition model, along the 
lines of Exhibits 2b and 2a, for the NORC data did not lead to an improvement in fit for 
the affect-cognition model. However, since only two global indicators were available 
for defining the cognitive factor, it was decided not to pursue the analysis of cognition 
further with these data. 
18 Personal Communications. 
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